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Abstract 
Collective wage contracts impose restrictions on wage-setting. We utilize 
German linked employer-employee data for blue-collar worker to compute 
the dispersion of wages and wage components within and across firms 
under three different wage-setting regimes: Establishments applying sec-
toral collective contracts, establishments with firm-level contracts and un-
covered establishments. The empirical analysis confirms a lower disper-
sion of wages and wage components for firms applying sectoral collective 
contracts compared to companies in the other two wage-setting regimes. 
Implications for policy are discussed. 
 
JEL-Code: J31, J51 
Keywords: Wage compression, collective contracts, establishment effects 
on wages. 
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1 Introduction 
Most studies of union wage effects analyze the impact of individual union 
membership on the wage structure (Card 1996, Blau & Kahn 1999, Booth 
& Bryan 2001, Budd & Na 2000, Card et al. 2003). In West Germany, 
however, less than one third of employees are union members, but almost 
80 percent of workers are covered by collective agreements (Pfeiffer 
2003, for the year 2000), since firms applying collective contracts do usu-
ally not differentiate across workers with and without union membership. 
Our goal is to investigate differences in wage dispersion across three 
wage-setting regimes in Germany: First establishments applying collective 
contracts at the industry-level, second establishments with firm-level con-
tracts and third establishments without coverage. For each wage-setting 
regime, we decompose wages into establishment effects on wages, remu-
neration of human capital and wage residuals. The main hypothesis is that 
dispersion of all wage components is smallest within the group of firms 
applying collective contracts. We conduct the analysis for two different 
years, one characterized by an economic boom (1990) and one marked by 
an economic slump (1995). 
Our approach requires linked employer-employee data (Hamermesh 
1999), that provide information about wages and characteristics at the 
individual level and about the application of collective contracts at the firm 
level. Only few investigations on the wage effects of coverage by collective 
contracts are based on linked employer-employee data. Freeman (1982) 
compares the wage dispersion within and across firms in the union and 
non-union sector in different industries for the USA. His main result is that 
unionized companies have a much lower within and between dispersion of 
wages than comparable non-covered firms in the same industries. Hartog 
et al. (2000) assess the magnitudes of wage differentials under corporatist 
labor relations within the Netherlands. They conclude that in terms of the 
wage structure it is mainly the regime with firm level bargaining that dif-
fers from the collective bargaining and the individual bargaining regime. 
For Germany studies are lacking that analyze the impact of firms and indi-
vidual characteristics on the dispersion of wages in different bargaining 
regimes. However, a broad consensus exists that the wage structure 
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across qualifications has not changed substantially in the period from 
1975 to 1995, despite high unemployment and decreasing employment 
rates of less qualified employees (Steiner & Wagner 1998, Möller 1999). 
Fitzenberger & Franz (2001) recently estimated that nominal wages of less 
qualified workers would have to decrease by 14 to 37 percent to attain a 
50 percent reduction of their unemployment. Büttner & Fitzenberger 
(1998) find empirical support for suppressed local wage flexibility with re-
spect to regional unemployment particularly for less qualified labor. 
Macroeconomic studies argue that wage inequality decreases with trade-
union density, bargaining coverage and bargaining centralization and co-
ordination (OECD Employment Outlook 1997, Flanagan 1999). Thus the 
high degree of coverage by collective agreements might be one source of 
the relatively stable and compressed German wage structure and its pre-
sumable impact on the high unemployment of less qualified labor. It is, 
however, difficult for cross-country studies to establish empirically that 
bargaining coverage equalizes wages, since the wage distribution is affec-
ted by a host of additional causal factors which differ between countries. A 
differentiation between wage-setting regimes within a country could help 
to clarify if wage compression is in fact more accentuated under collective 
bargaining regimes than in establishments without coverage.1 Our analysis 
shows that such differences exist within Germany. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses restrictions 
imposed by collective contracts and develops testable hypotheses. In sec-
tion 3 we introduce the data set, the method of analysis and the variables. 
Section 4 presents the main results of the empirical investigation, which is 
complemented by a sensitivity analysis (addressing problems of sample 
restrictions, weighting and self-selection) in Section 5. Section 6 summa-
rizes and draws conclusions. 
2 Hypotheses 
The literature offers several arguments why unions try to compress the 
distribution of wages, in particular by attaching wages to job-grades 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Daniel Hamermesh for this point. 
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(Freeman & Medoff 1984, Blau & Kahn 1999, Katz & Autor 1999, Lemieux 
1998, Agell 2001). First, by establishing a relatively uniform wage struc-
ture within and across firms unions strengthen the solidarity and organiza-
tional unity among workers with different skills and job tasks. Second, at-
taching wages to jobs reduces the opportunities of supervisors to favor or 
discriminate specific workers. Third, risk-averse union members facing un-
certainty about their future wage will be prefer wage compression. Fourth, 
if union behavior is determined by the median member and the mean 
wage exceeds the median wage unions will press for higher wage gains for 
lower paid workers. However, the extent of wage compression induced by 
industry-level collective agreements is restrained by several factors, four 
of which will be addressed briefly.  
First, skilled workers with relatively deteriorating wage positions might opt 
out this system of wage determination by either pressing for individual 
bargains or by forming separate unions (Turner 1952). More recently  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that skill-biased technical change favoring 
qualified employees has been an important factor in observed de-
unionization, in the diminished importance of collective contracts and in 
the rise of inequality of wages. However, union-induced wage compression 
might also increase incentives for employer-provided training of less skil-
led workers (Acemoglu & Pischke 1999, Böheim & Booth 2003). 
Second, firms covered by collective contracts facing collectively negotiated 
minimum wages and a compressed wage structure can adjust their hiring 
standards and select workers with high productivity due to unobserved 
and observed endowments. Formally, this can be modeled as fixing a hir-
ing standard and wage offer simultaneously. Schlicht (2002) captures this 
idea in an efficiency wage model.  
Third, companies facing wage compression can respond by changing their 
payment systems and, for example, install piece-rate systems for a large 
proportion of the workforce. In fact, for Germany empirical studies find a 
positive correlation between works councils and the existence of piece-
rate systems, while the correlation between collective contracts and piece-
rates is positive, but statistically insignificant (Heywood et al. 1998). 
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Fourth, Lindbeck & Snower (2001) argue that collective contracts at the 
industry-level are increasingly inefficient in the ongoing reorganization 
process, which is characterized by changes from occupational specializa-
tion to multi-skilling. This process again favors more educated workers 
who are more versatile in meeting the requirements of diversified tasks. 
As already mentioned, in Germany the application of collective wage con-
tracts at the firm level and not individual union membership has an impact 
on wages. Under the German system of regional and sectoral bargaining 
employers’ associations and unions conclude collective wage agreements 
that set minimum wages for member firms of employers’ associations, 
which in rare cases are extended to non-member firms by the Federal 
Ministry of Labor. In addition, non-members of employers’ associations 
might agree formally or informally to meet the conditions of these sec-
toral-level agreements or refer to these agreements in individual con-
tracts. As an alternative to the application of industry-wide collective 
agreements firms can negotiate directly with a union to obtain a firm-level 
contract. Within this context the preferences of unions for a compressed 
wage structure motivate the following hypotheses: 
First, overall dispersion of log wages should be smallest for workers 
employed by firms applying collective contracts and highest for workers 
employed in firms negotiating wages individually. Collectively negotiated 
wages on the basis of job classifications are minimum wages, standardi-
zing wages between firms in an industrial sector and implementing the 
goal ”equal pay for equal work” heralded by unions. In conjunction with 
the intention of unions to compress the wage structure this implies a 
compressed wage distribution for firms applying collective contracts. 
Second, we expect limited differences in wage dispersion within compa-
nies applying industry-level contracts and applying firm-level contracts, 
but wage dispersion across companies is expected to be larger for the lat-
ter regime. Firm-level contracts may relax restrictions of industry-level 
collective agreements and adapt the general level of wages within the 
company to firm-specific conditions (although in general unions refuse to 
undermine conditions negotiated in industry-level agreements), while at 
the same time pursuing the goal of wage compression within firms. 
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Third, wage dispersion across firms should decline if we control for the 
characteristics of firms’ workforce, but it will remain comparatively smaller 
across companies applying industry-level collective contracts compared to 
the two other wage-setting regimes. The underlying reason is that wage 
variation across firms within the three regimes is partly a result of differ-
ences in the human capital endowment of firms. 
Fourth, the fraction of wage dispersion that can be explained by worker 
characteristics should be largest in the uncovered regime. Union bargain-
ing policy of pressing for a less dispersed wage structure can be expected 
to result in relatively low rates of return to human capital. 
Fifth, controlling for worker characteristics and for the company, the dis-
persion of wage residuals can be expected to be highest for firms in the 
uncovered regime. In accordance with the first hypothesis, this is a result 
of union’s policy to attach wages to jobs and not to individual workers. 
3 Data, Method and Variables 
The empirical analysis uses the Salary and Wage Structure Survey ("Ge-
halts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung") of the Statistical Offices of the Federal 
German States. It is one of the rare databases in Germany combining in-
formation on employees and employers (Stephan 2001, gives a detailed 
description). We have access to the 1990 and 1995 data for Lower 
Saxony, one of the larger federal states in northwest Germany, in which 
around 11 percent of all West German employees work. The data are 
drawn as a two-stage random sample (the percentage of employees sur-
veyed depends on firm size) from all establishments in the entire manu-
facturing sector and in selected service sectors; establishments as well as 
employees included in the data set differ in successive surveys. 
The data include information on wages, working time and personal charac-
teristics of workers. Most important, each establishment applying a spe-
cific collective contract identifies this agreement in the questionnaire. 
More detailed information on firms – especially on membership in an em-
ployer-association, on the existence of a works council and on the internal 
organization of firms – is, however, not available. In the past, unions have 
tended to raise wages for low-income full-time workers and their power is 
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analysis conducted in this paper is restricted to blue-collar workers from 
establishments in manufacturing. In our basic estimates we include estab-
lishments with 100 to 10.000 employees and a minimum of 5 observa-
tions per firm; we modify these size restrictions in Section 5. Furthermore, 
the analysis is restricted to full-time employees with a working time of at 
least 30 weekly hours employed during the entire survey year. The re-
maining data set contains about 20.000 blue-collar workers from more 
than 500 establishments in each year. 
We are interested in standard deviations of wages and wage components 
under the three wage-setting regimes investigated. The method applied 
draws on related work using linked employer-employee data by Abowd et 
al. (2001), Bronars & Famulari (1997) and Bronars et al. (1999), who do, 
however, not distinguish between different wage-setting regimes. Basical-
ly, for each of the three wage-setting regimes a wage equation with fixed 
establishment effects is estimated, 
(1) yik = Xikβ + φk + uik. 
Here yik is log hourly wages, Xik is a vector of individual characteristics and 
uik is an i.i.d. residual of individual i working in firm k, while φk is a fixed 
establishment effect on wages paid by firm k. An important advantage of 
the fixed effects approach is that is does – in contrast to a random effects 
approach – not require human capital variables and establishment effects 
on wages to be independent of each other (see for instance Maddala 
1997: 633). The estimated ”worker quality index” Xikβ  is the log wage in-
dividual i can expect to receive in the standard firm. The estimated estab-
lishment effect φ k paid to all workers in firm k is conceived as a ”global” 
establishment effect on wages (Kramarz et al. 1996), including a ”pure” 
establishment effect and mean remuneration for unobserved skills within a 
firm (since our data are cross-sections, we cannot control for individual 
heterogeneity of workers within firms). 
ˆ
ˆ
Based on equation (1) the dispersion of log wages can be decomposed 
into four components: 
(2) Var(y) = Var(Xβ ) + Var( ) + 2⋅Cov( ,φ ) + Var( ). ˆ φˆ βˆX ˆ uˆ
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The comparison of the right-hand side four components – variance of wor-
ker quality indices, establishment effects on wages and residuals as well 
as the co-variance across worker quality indices and establishment effects 
– across wage-setting regimes is the main theme of our paper. 
It should be noted that in the following section standard deviations instead 
of variances and correlations instead co-variances are presented, since 
these can be interpreted conveniently as an approximately average per-
centage deviation from conditional means and thus as a relative measure 
of wage dispersion. Standard deviations of worker quality indices are 
computed across individuals, standard deviations of establishment wage 
effects are computed across establishments, and standard deviations of 
wage residuals are computed as the regression’s estimated root mean 
square error. Under the assumption of normality the standard error of an 
estimated standard deviation σ  can be approximated by  = ˆ Sσˆ N2σˆ  (see 
for instance Spiegel 1972: 144), where N is the number of observations 
the standard deviation is based on. 
A significant issue is whether differences in standard deviations of wage 
components in both years and in the three regimes investigated are 
mainly due to the composition of samples. We cannot address this prob-
lem for all wage components, since the firms surveyed differ in both years 
and, of course, also across wage-setting regimes. However, for each wave 
of the survey and for each regime we compute the hypothetical standard 
deviation for the worker quality index that would have resulted under 
rates of return to human capital in the other wave and regimes, with es-
tablishment effects normalized to zero. 
Subsequently, the variables are described briefly. The dependent variable 
is log hourly wages, which is computed not taking into account overtime 
hours and overtime payments (the inclusion of pay for overtime hours rai-
ses hourly wages by about one percent and does not affect the results of 
the following regression analysis). Wages in 1990 are adjusted to wages 
in 1995 according to the private consumer price index for West Germany. 
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In the vector Xik of individual characteristics we include tenure and poten-
tial experience (both cubic), years required to achieve the highest educa-
tional attainment (abbreviated as schooling), three dummies for basic job 
grades, dummies for performance pay and a dummy for gender. As usual, 
schooling and potential experience are interpreted as proxies for general 
human capital, while tenure – although problems of endogeneity might 
occur – captures specific human capital. Basic job grades, which classify 
requirements for jobs as unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled or skilled with spe-
cial tasks, serve as additional proxy variables for general and specific hu-
man capital. In addition, dummies are included for piece-rates, premium-
pay and mixed regimes (the standard category are time wages). 
4 Main Results 
Table 1 presents means and sample sizes for workers (Panel I) and estab-
lishments (Panel II). As expected, mean log hourly wages are lowest in 
establishments without collective or firm-level agreements (1990: 3.01, 
1995: 3.05) and highest in firms with firm-level contracts (1990: 3.16, 
1995: 3.25). Kernel estimates of log hourly wages are presented in Figure 
1 and 2. At a first glance, it seems that the wage distribution under sec-
toral collective contracts is almost identical to the wage distribution under 
firm-level contracts. However, as the following analysis shows, the disper-
sion of estimated wage components differs significantly under both re-
gimes. 
Years of schooling differences (means and overall standard deviations) are 
negligible across the three groups of firms. Mean tenure and experience 
are lowest in uncovered firms and highest in establishments with a firm-
level contract, which might be related to the fact that internal labor mar-
kets are more prominent in the latter group of companies. The percentage 
of women is highest in uncovered firms. Piece rates are most likely to ex-
ist in firms applying sectoral collective contracts, while premium wages 
are mainly used within firms negotiating firm-level contracts. 
In our basic sample – consisting of establishments with at least 100 em-
ployees – about 70 percent of all establishments remunerate workers ac-
cording to industry-level collective contracts. The remaining firms are di-
vided equally between establishments with a firm-level contract and es-
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tablishment negotiating wages individually. The share of employees and 
firms in the uncovered regime has increased slightly from 1990 to 1995 
- it is well known that during the last decade an increasing number of 
firms has abandoned industry-level collective bargaining in order to 
achieve more flexible agreements at the plant or individual level (Leh-
mann 2001). While mean establishment size is smallest in the uncovered 
regime, due to the firm-size dependent two-stage sampling procedure the 
mean number of observations per firm is of approximately equal size ac-
ross the three regimes. This rules out the possibility that the computed 
variances of variables are dominated by the fact that random errors are 
more likely to occur in observing the workforce of smaller establishments. 
Table 2 contains our main results, presenting overall standard deviations 
of log wages, a simple variance decomposition of log wages by establish-
ments and the decomposition of log wages suggested in equation (2). Ta-
ble 3 summarizes the results from two-sided F-tests on the equality of the 
standard deviations presented in Table 2 across wage-setting regimes and 
across years.  
As expected in our first hypothesis, in both years the overall standard de-
viation of log wages (Panel I in Table 2 and 3) is lowest across workers 
employed in firms applying sectoral level collective contracts (1990: 0.19, 
1995: 0.20) and highest across workers employed in the uncovered re-
gime (1990: 0.22, 1995: 0.25). It is obvious that overall wage dispersion 
for blue-collar workers has increased, and this occurred mainly in the un-
covered regime.  
A simple variance analysis by establishments (Panel II of Table 2 and 3) 
partly confirms our second hypothesis. The idea was that under industry-
level collective contracts unions’ wage policy compresses  wages within as 
well as across firms, while firm-level contracts compress wages within the 
firm but endow firms with more degrees in freedom in adjusting their ge-
neral wage level. Differences in across-firm dispersion are in fact larger 
across these regimes than differences in within-firm dispersion. The differ-
ence is significant, however, only in 1990. 
The results for the variance decomposition suggested in equation (2) are 
documented in Panel III of Table 2 and 3. The underlying estimates of 
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equation (1) will be discussed briefly at the end of this section. It is evi-
dent that the standard deviation of establishment effects on wages condi-
tional on worker characteristics is smaller than the unconditional standard 
deviation of wages across firms. Again, our third hypothesis is only partly 
confirmed. The standard deviations of establishment effects tends to ex-
hibit lower values for firms with industry-wide agreements compared to 
both other regimes investigated, but the differences are only partly signifi-
cant. A recent study shows that employer wage differentials are less dis-
persed in Germany than in Denmark, France, and the USA (Stephan 
2002). The findings imply that country-specific differences may result 
partly from the fact that industry-level collective contracts smooth condi-
tional establishment effects on wages across firms. 
Comparing 1990 to 1995 we observe an increasing standard deviation of 
establishment effects on wages for firms in the wage-setting regimes of 
industry-wide and individual agreements. Apparently wage determination 
has become slightly more flexible in the regime of sectoral wage bargain-
ing. In particular firms in the regime of individual contracts react to per-
sistent high rates of unemployment and the ongoing technological and or-
ganizational change by adapting their wages with increasing flexibility. 
In accordance with the fourth and fifth hypothesis the standard deviations 
of worker quality indices and wage residuals are largest in the uncovered 
regime at standard levels of significance. For worker quality indices we 
compute hypothetical standard deviations for workers with the same char-
acteristics with rates of return for the other wave and for the other re-
gimes. These values are documented in the Panel IV und V of Table 2. 
While substituting rates of return by years does not lead to notable differ-
ences, we find a remarkable effect if rates of return are replaced by re-
gimes: The dispersion of worker quality indices would have been much 
higher in firms applying sectoral or firm-level contracts if rates of return to 
human capital are substituted from the uncovered regime, correspond-
ingly, the standard deviation of worker quality indices would have de-
creased in the uncovered regime with rates of return under collective con-
tracts. This implies that wage smoothing in firms applying collective con-
tracts is caused to a large extent by compressed returns to observed indi-
vidual characteristics. 
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Finally, some remarks concerning the wage regressions underlying Panel 
III to V of Table 2 are added. The regressions are documented in Table 
A.1 in the Appendix (Panel I), which shows that the coefficients for the 
variables are in most cases significant and have the expected sign. Since 
the analysis is restricted to blue-collar workers schooling does not have an 
impact on wages in any regime which is due to the low variance of this 
variable. To assess the extent of the differences in mean log wages across 
years and across regimes caused by worker and workplace characteristics 
we take the following approach: We compute for workers in each year or 
regime the predicted wages using rates of return estimated for the other 
year or the other regimes (Panel II and III). The results show that work-
ers (with given characteristics) employed in 1990 would have earned ap-
proximately the same average wage under rates of return for 1995 (only 
workers in firms applying firm-level contracts would have obtained slightly 
higher earnings). The moderately higher average wages in 1995 are thus 
mainly a result of different characteristics of the workforce – as Table 1 
shows, worker have on average about one year more tenure and potential 
experience in 1995. Furthermore, on average workers employed under 
collective or firm-level contracts would have earned less if they would ha-
ve been remunerated according to individual wage contracts, but more 
than employees actually working in the regime with individually negoti-
ated wages. Thus, wage differences across regimes are partly due to ob-
served worker and workplace characteristics. 
5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 4 presents a sensitivity analysis to test for the robustness of the re-
sults presented in Section 4. The underlying 36 wage regressions are not 
documented here, but can be obtained by the authors on request. 
First, we replicate the analysis for samples of firms with at least 50 or al-
ternatively 250 employees (instead of 100 workers as in our basic ver-
sion). The second replication has the additional advantage that firms with 
more than 250 employees apart from rare exceptions dispose of works 
councils (Addison et al. 2001). Interactions of works councils and cover-
age are an important element of wage-setting in Germany (Hübler & Jir-
jahn 2001). The results are presented in Panel I and II of Table 3 and 
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show that modifying the minimum firm size does have an impact on esti-
mated standard deviations, but that the findings do not change qualita-
tively. 
Second, tenure can be assumed to be endogenous in wage regressions. 
Attempts to instrument tenure failed because of a lack of identifying vari-
ables. We therefore analyze if the results of the regression analysis chan-
ge significantly if we exclude tenure from our estimates. Panel II of Table 
3 reveals that excluding tenure from the wage regressions with fixed es-
tablishment effects does not have an impact on the results. 
Third, it can be argued that the sampling procedure could influence the 
results and that furthermore each worker might self-select into the regime 
where his or her wage is maximized. However, the impact of weighting 
and self-selection cannot be amended using a fixed effects approach. The-
refore, we estimate several variants of the equation 
(3) yik = Xikβ + Zk + uik
where Zk is a vector of firm characteristics including firm size (cubic) and 
sectoral affiliation (9 sector dummies), that is assumed to control for im-
portant features of the employer. For these estimates we document stan-
dard deviations of wage residuals and of wage components explained by 
human capital, firm size and sectoral affiliation. 
In particular, we estimate equation (3) first by Ordinary Least Squares, 
second taking into account sampling weights and third correcting for self-
selection. The Statistical Office computes weighting factors for each 
worker that account of the sampling procedure at the first and the second 
stage of the survey, which we apply in a Weighted Least Squares Model. 
We correct wage-regressions for workers’ self-selection into one of the re-
gimes by estimating a multinomial logit model and including selection 
terms in the wage regressions (Lee 1983). As explanatory wages in the 
selection equation we include all variables from the wage equation, with 
the exception of basic job grades. 
The results are documented in Panel IV of Table 3 and show that weight-
ing and controlling for self-selection do not alter standard deviations of 
estimated wage components compared to the Ordinary Least Squares-
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estimates. We interpret this as a hint that suppressing weights and con-
trols for self-selection, which cannot be taken into account in the fixed ef-
fects approach underlying equation (2), do not have a substantial impact 
on the results presented in Section 4. 
Finally, the entire analysis presented in Section 4 has also been conducted 
separately by gender. The results indicate that – similar to individual un-
ion membership (Card et al. 2003) – coverage by collective contracts 
seems to compress wages more strongly for male than for female work-
ers. We suppose as the main underlying reason that women are more 
concentrated in the lower end of the wage distribution under each wage-
setting regime. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
The primary focus of our paper is to compare the distribution of blue-collar 
workers’ wages and predicted wage components across firms under differ-
ent wage-setting regimes in Germany. Using linked employer-employee 
data we distinguish between establishments not applying an industrial-
level or firm level collective wage contract, establishments with sectoral 
collective contracts and establishments with firm-level contracts. Previous 
theoretical and empirical work has demonstrated that unions prefer a 
compressed wage structure and an attachment of wages to job grades. 
Collective wage contracts impose restrictions on wage determination 
within and across firms, by setting minimum wages for job grades and 
compressing the structure of wages across grades and firms. 
As was briefly mentioned in the introductory section wage compression 
might have an impact on the unequal incidence of unemployment across 
workers with different qualifications. Based on a survey of managers from 
801 firms in 2000 Franz & Pfeiffer (2001) argue that wage rigidities for 
highly skilled workers in Germany are the result of efficiency wage consid-
erations whereas these rigidities in the labor markets for less qualified 
workers are mainly due to collective contracts. Based on a micro-data set 
we do also find strong evidence that wage compression for less skilled 
workers is partly related to the German system of collective bargaining: 
Our empirical analysis of German blue-collar workers’ wages in 1990 and 
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1995 confirms that the dispersion of wages and of wage components is in 
fact lowest for firms applying industry-level collective contracts. 
It is therefore not surprising that the wage bargaining system in Germany 
is under severe attack (Fitzenberger & Franz 1999), although persuasive 
empirical findings to demonstrate its inefficiency have been lacking. In our 
perspective, the German sectoral wage bargaining system has specific ad-
vantages like the reduction of transaction costs, the partial internalization 
of external effects of wage-setting, and its impact on the relationship be-
tween management, works councils and workforces which is rarely af-
fected by conflicts about wages. Furthermore, we observe that wage dis-
persion under industry-level collective contracts has in fact been slightly 
increasing from 1990 to 1995, which might indicate a reaction to persis-
tent high rates of unemployment and ongoing technological and organiza-
tional changes. For these reasons and taking into consideration the politi-
cal feasibility a strategy to abolish the entire system of collective bargain-
ing is not a promising alternative. Reforms within the system, however, 
are indispensable. 
Membership in an employers’ association and the extension of collective 
contracts to non-union employees within firms is voluntary. However, opt-
ing out of the system of collective bargaining is hampered under the cur-
rent law and regulations by a relatively long validity of the prevailing con-
tract. The alternative to resign from an employers’ association should thus 
be facilitated for firms. Furthermore, concerning wage dispersion, an effi-
cient opening should be enacted in the Collective Bargaining Act and be 
obligatory for all collective contracts with the objective to increase the fle-
xibility and plant-level orientation of wage-setting and to enhance the 
possibility of differentiating wages within sectoral agreements. On the ba-
sis of an opening clause management and a majority of workers and/or 
the works council should be able to deviate from the terms of a collective 
agreement without approval from the employers’ associations and the un-
ion in severe economic conditions of the firm. Both modifications would 
enhance competition between the different wage-setting regimes consti-
tuting the German bargaining system. 
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Figure 1: Kernel estimates of the distribution of log hourly wages in 1990 
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Figure 2: Kernel estimates of the distribution of log hourly wages in 1995 
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Table 1: Means and sample size 
  1990 1995 
  C F N C F N 
I Worker characteristics             
  Log hourly wages  3,14 3,16 3,01 3,20 3,25 3,05 
  Schooling 11,3 11,2 11,2 11,3 11,4 11,3 
  Tenure 10,6 12,5 7,3 11,5 13,4 8,0 
  Potential experience 20,6 21,6 17,9 21,8 22,4 19,8 
  Female* 0,20 0,16 0,29 0,18 0,15 0,27 
  Unskilled* 0,15 0,18 0,16 0,18 0,17 0,13 
  Semi-skilled* 0,34 0,29 0,36 0,32 0,25 0,37 
  Skilled* 0,29 0,33 0,38 0,32 0,34 0,47 
  Skilled with special tasks* 0,22 0,20 0,10 0,18 0,24 0,03 
  Time pay* 0,64 0,72 0,70 0,65 0,61 0,81 
  Premium pay* 0,12 0,18 0,03 0,12 0,25 0,06 
  Piece rate* 0,20 0,01 0,12 0,18 0,06 0,06 
  Mixed pay* 0,04 0,08 0,14 0,05 0,08 0,06 
  Number of workers 17.373 3.339 2.367 17.268 3.288 3.160 
II Establishment characteristics       
  Energy & water* 0,02 0,19 0,00 0,03 0,19 0,02 
  Mining* 0,03 0,06 0,00 0,02 0,14 0,02 
  Chemicals & mineral oil* 0,06 0,03 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,04 
  Rubber* 0,08 0,10 0,08 0,11 0,04 0,07 
  Soil & ceramics & glass* 0,04 0,10 0,03 0,05 0,09 0,03 
  Metal* 0,06 0,07 0,03 0,08 0,10 0,11 
  Construction of machines & vehicles* 0,28 0,10 0,18 0,19 0,13 0,21 
  Electrotechnics & fine mechanics & optics* 0,19 0,06 0,19 0,11 0,04 0,11 
  Wood & paper & printings* 0,12 0,07 0,14 0,13 0,05 0,08 
  Leather & textiles* 0,06 0,06 0,12 0,06 0,00 0,09 
  Food* 0,07 0,18 0,16 0,14 0,15 0,23 
  Firm size 619 560 285 446 455 261 
  Observations per firm 48 46 32 40 42 31 
  Number of establishments 364 72 73 429 79 101 
C = Application of collective contract at the industry-level.   
F = Application of firm-level contract.  
N = No application of collective or firm-level contract.   
Only workers from establishments with at least 100 employees.  
*) Dummy variables. 
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Table 2: Standard deviations (SD) and their standard error (in parenthesis)  
for log wages and estimated log wage components 
    1990 1995 
    C F N C F N 
I Overall SD 0,188 0,209 0,219 0,201 0,211 0,254 
    (0,001) (0,003) (0,003) (0,001) (0,003) (0,003)
II Variance analysis by establishments             
  SD across establishments 0,137 0,165 0,153 0,148 0,159 0,202 
    (0,005) (0,014) (0,013) (0,005) (0,013) (0,014)
  SD within establishments 0,129 0,131 0,157 0,135 0,141 0,155 
    (0,001) (0,002) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,002)
III Regression with fixed establishment effects           
  SD establishment effects 0,102 0,133 0,103 0,121 0,134 0,146 
    (0,004) (0,011) (0,009) (0,004) (0,011) (0,010)
  SD residuals 0,091 0,098 0,108 0,103 0,110 0,119 
    (0,000) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002)
  SD worker quality index  0,120 0,110 0,141 0,111 0,115 0,130 
    (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002)
  Corr. (worker quality, establishment effect) 0,183 0,307 0,198 0,223 0,189 0,277 
IV SD worker quality indices with             
  rates of return as in 1990 0,120 0,110 0,141 0,113 0,120 0,125 
    (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002)
  rates of return as in 1995 0,119 0,113 0,154 0,111 0,115 0,130 
    (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002)
V SD worker quality indices with             
  rates of return as under C 0,120 0,111 0,116 0,111 0,116 0,096 
    (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
  rates of return as under F 0,124 0,110 0,121 0,111 0,115 0,090 
    (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
  rates of return as under N 0,145 0,137 0,141 0,149 0,154 0,130 
    (0,001) (0,002) (0,002) (0,001) (0,002) (0,002)
C = Application of collective contract at the industry-level.   
F = Application of firm-level contract.  
N = No application of collective or firm-level contract. 
Only workers from establishments with at least 100 employees.   
Cursive types mark hypothetical predicted values.  
The underlying wage regressions for Panel III to V are documented in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
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Table 3: Probability values from two-sided F-tests  
on the equality of standard deviations 
    1990 1995 1990-1995 
    C-F C-N F-N C-F C-N F-N C F N 
I Overall SD 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,44 0,00 
II Variance analysis by establishments               
  SD across establishments 0,04 0,21 0,54 0,42 0,00 0,03 0,10 0,77 0,01 
  SD within establishment 0,28 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,47 
III Regression with fixed establishment effects          
  SD establishment effects 0,01 0,93 0,03 0,23 0,01 0,40 0,00 0,95 0,00 
  SD residuals 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
  SD worker quality index  0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
C = Application of collective contract at the industry-level.   
F = Application of firm-level contract.  
N = No application of collective or firm-level contract. 
Only workers from establishments with at least 100 employees. 
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Table 4: Sensitivity analysis 
    1990 1995 
    C F N C F N 
I Establishments with at least 50 employees             
  Overall SD  0.188 0.215 0.221 0.201 0.210 0.248
  Variance analysis by establishments           
  SD across establishments 0.136 0.173 0.158 0.149 0.160 0.194
  SD within establishment 0.130 0.131 0.156 0.135 0.140 0.159
  Regressions with fixed establishment effects           
  SD establishment effects 0.104 0.145 0.105 0.121 0.137 0.139
  SD residuals 0.092 0.098 0.107 0.103 0.110 0.120
  SD worker quality index 0.120 0.110 0.142 0.111 0.116 0.134
  Corr. (worker quality index,establishment effects) 0.170 0.328 0.231 0.216 0.196 0.232
II Establishments with at least 250 employees             
  Overall SD  0.181 0.194 0.229 0.194 0.200 0.272
  Variance analysis by establishments           
  SD across establishments 0.128 0.147 0.163 0.138 0.150 0.236
  SD within establishment 0.129 0.131 0.164 0.136 0.140 0.143
  Regressions with fixed establishment effects           
  SD establishment effects 0.084 0.119 0.120 0.099 0.113 0.180
  SD residuals 0.092 0.098 0.111 0.104 0.112 0.111
  SD worker quality index 0.119 0.104 0.143 0.111 0.116 0.123
  Corr. (worker quality index,establishment  effects) 0.187 0.219 0.258 0.228 0.182 0.389
III Establishments with at least 100 employees             
  Regressions with fixed establishment effects, excluding tenure      
  SD establishment effects 0.103 0.134 0.105 0.122 0.134 0.151
  SD residuals 0.092 0.098 0.112 0.104 0.111 0.122
  SD worker quality index 0.118 0.108 0.138 0.109 0.114 0.125
  Corr. (worker quality index,establishment  effects) 0.180 0.291 0.189 0.213 0.183 0.226
IV Establishments with at least 100 employees             
  Regressions with controls for firm size and sector        
  SD residuals 0.119 0.109 0.132 0.135 0.136 0.155
  SD explained wage component 0.145 0.178 0.174 0.148 0.162 0.202
  Weighted regressions with controls for firm size and sector       
  SD residuals 0.119 0.110 0.133 0.136 0.137 0.155
  SD explained wage component 0.144 0.178 0.173 0.147 0.158 0.201
  Regressions with controls for firm size, sector and self-selection     
  SD residuals 0.119 0.109 0.132 0.135 0.135 0.155
  SD explained wage component 0.145 0.178 0.174 0.149 0.163 0.201
V Number of workers by size restriction          
  Establishments with at least 100 employees 17373 3339 2367 17268 3288 3160 
  Establishments with at least 50 employees 18380 3500 2708 18288 3416 3977 
  Establishments with at least 250 employees 13620 2543 1097 11629 2287 1497 
  Number of establishments by size restriction        
  Establishments with at least 100 employees 364 72 73 429 79 101 
  Establishments with at least 50 employees 415 81 90 494 87 141 
  Establishments with at least 250 employees 213 43 23 218 40 29 
C = Application of collective contract at the industry-level.   
F = Application of firm-level contract.  
N = No application of collective or firm-level contract.  
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Table A.1: Log wage regressions with fixed establishment effects on wages 
    1990 1995 
    C F N C F N 
I Schooling / 10 0.041  -0.001  -0.008  0.056  0.051  0.096  
  Tenure / 10 0.068** 0.073** 0.171** 0.081** 0.013  0.172** 
  (Tenure / 10)2 -0.030** -0.031** -0.092** -0.032** 0.005  -0.089** 
  (Tenure / 10)3 0.005** 0.004** 0.016** 0.005** -0.001  0.015** 
  Potential experience / 100 0.049** 0.072** 0.075** 0.046** 0.065* 0.112** 
  (Potential experience / 10)2 -0.013** -0.030** -0.022  -0.013** -0.019  -0.038** 
  (Potential experience / 10)3 0.001  0.004** 0.002  0.001  0.001  0.004* 
  Semi-skilled 0.083** 0.071** 0.076** 0.073** 0.082** 0.102** 
  Skilled 0.171** 0.169** 0.160** 0.160** 0.159** 0.165** 
  Skilled, with special tasks 0.241** 0.233** 0.218** 0.242** 0.264** 0.286** 
  Premium pay 0.045** 0.093** -0.013  0.059** 0.021  0.091** 
  Piece rate 0.074** 0.126** 0.108** 0.077** 0.069** 0.059** 
  Mixed pay 0.060** 0.036** 0.039** 0.046** 0.074** 0.064** 
  Female -0.111** -0.118** -0.175** -0.091** -0.087** -0.166** 
  Constant 2.891** 2.956** 2.826** 2.926** 2.968** 2.700** 
  Number of workers 17373 3339 2367 17268 3288 3160 
  Number of establishments 364 72 73 429 79 101 
  Corrected R2 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.78 
II Predicted wage with       
  rates of return as in 1990 3.14 3.16 3.01 3.14 3.19 3.02 
  rates of return as in 1995 3.20 3.23 3.05 3.20 3.25 3.05 
III Predicted wage with       
  rates of return as under C 3.14 3.14 3.11 3.20 3.22 3.16 
  rates of return as under F 3.17 3.16 3.13 3.23 3.25 3.19 
  rates of return as under N 3.06 3.05 3.01 3.11 3.14 3.05 
C = Application of collective contract at the industry-level.   
F = Application of firm-level contract.  
N = No application of collective or firm-level contract.   
Only workers from establishments with at least 100 employees.  
Cursive types mark hypothetical predicted values.  
The corrected R2 refers to the explanatory power of individual characteristics and establishment effect. 
*) Significant at α = 0.05.  
**) Significant at α = 0.01. 
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